This article considers the rights of those displaced by armed conflict to their property and to return home under general international law in light of Demopoulos and its impact on subsequent cases. The European Court of Human Rights dismissed the case as inadmissible on the ground that the Immovable Property Commission (IPC) established by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was an effective domestic remedy which should have been exhausted first. Significantly, the Court concluded that the lapse of significant time and the political nature of a dispute should influence its decision whilst property restitution is not the only available remedy to those displaced. This article takes a critical stance on these conclusions. In doing so it emphasises the significance of property restitution and to return home and argues that the decision, as evident from postDemopoulos developments, fundamentally undermines the established rights of the displaced giving primacy to political realism.
Introduction
Forcible displacement because of armed conflict continues to constitute a human rights problem of significant proportions.
1 Such civilian uprooting has serious implications for the displaced population. Displacement in this context is associated with deprivation of fundamental rights including the rights to property and to home and freedom of movement and settlement in one's own country. It may also amount to a war crime and a crime against humanity under certain circumstances. 2 Hence, displaced persons, irrespective of whether they have crossed an international border, require the effective protection of international law.
This article critically assesses the conclusions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Demopoulos. 3 Indeed, the decision raises broader questions relating to the rights of the displaced affected by armed conflict and foreign occupation, particularly their right to property and to return home. 4 With continuing conflict worldwide, it is essential to see how contemporary international law responds to such challenges and what safeguards are in place for their protection. It is also important to see how the 4 Cyprus she had been prevented from peaceful enjoyment of her possessions. 8 The case was referred to the ECtHR which held that Turkey was solely responsible for TRNC acts and that the violations had a continuing character. Mindful of the fact that the ECHR must not be read in isolation of other rules of international law, including those prohibiting armed force, the ECtHR concluded that the applicant had not validly lost title over her property. 9 It further found that Turkey's acts constituted a total and continuous denial of access and purported expropriation without compensation. This was in breach of P1-1. 10 The ECtHR, taking into consideration the TRNC's unlawful character, refused to 'attribute legal validity' to provisions interfering with property rights. Nevertheless, it considered it neither desirable nor necessary 'to elaborate a general theory concerning the lawfulness of legislative and administrative acts of the "TRNC".' 11 The judgment in Loizidou is significant in many respects, particularly relating to the responsibility of occupying forces for human rights violations in territories under their control. Even more so, it constitutes a landmark decision in ECtHR jurisprudence on the property rights of the displaced. The extent to which, however, later rulings are consistent with the conclusions in Loizidou is discussed below.
Importantly however, Loizidou opened the way to more individual applications. It was followed by Demades where the ECtHR concluded that Turkey's actions infringed not only the applicant's right to property, but also his right to have access to and use his home. Furthermore, the ECtHR refused to consider whether the Law on Compensation for Immovable Properties Located within the Boundaries of the TRNC adopted by Turkey in 2003 constituted an effective domestic remedy. This was because it was given effect after the hearing on admissibility. 12 Turkey's attempt to prevent further applications reaching the ECtHR, however, did not come as a surprise. This was particularly so after the conclusion in Cyprus v Turkey that remedies of de facto authorities such as the TRNC could be regarded as domestic remedies, in deviation from Loizidou. Yet again, the ECtHR concluded that due to property restrictions imposed by the TRNC Constitution resort to its courts did not provide an effective remedy. 13 Challenged by the wave of similar claims, the ECtHR took a further step of limiting individual access in Xenides-Arestis.
14 According to its ruling, 'the Court cannot ignore the fact that there are already approximately 1,400 property cases pending before the court brought primarily by Greek-Cypriots against Turkey. ' 15 Having initially concluded that the remedy under the 2003 law is not effective, 16 it called on Turkey to introduce a remedy 'which secures genuinely effective redress for the Convention violations' in this 8 Loizidou v Turkey (1997); 23 EHRR 513. 9 Ibid, at [43] and [46] . On TRNC illegality see United Nations SC Res 541, 18 November 1983, S/RES/541 (1983) and SC Res 550, 11 May 1984, S/RES/544 (1983) (1984) . 10 Loizidou, ibid, at [63] ; Cyprus v Turkey (2002); 35 EHRR 30 at [187] . 11 Loizidou, ibid, at [44] - [45] . 12 Demades v Turkey Application No 16219/90, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 31 July 2003 at [20] . 13 Cyprus v Turkey, supra n 10 at [184] . 14 Xenides-Arestis v Turkey (2011); 52 EHRR 16. 15 Ibid, at [38] . 16 and similar cases. 17 It did so by reference to article 46 ECHR which requires compliance with the Court's judgments. Whilst stressing that states parties are free to choose the means by which they will comply with their obligations, the court conditioned this on the compatibility of such means with its conclusions in these judgments. 18 In view of this, it ordered postponement of all similar claims until such remedy was introduced. 19 Following this, Turkey adopted the Law for the Compensation, Exchange and Restitution of Immovable Properties (law 67/2005) by which it established the IPC. The role of the IPC is to consider Greek-Cypriot property claims. However, in deciding the question of just satisfaction in Xenides-Aresti, the ECtHR rejected Turkey's claim that the applicant should, at that stage of the proceedings and after it had made a judgment on the merits, resort to the IPC. 20 Nevertheless, the Court welcomed the steps taken by Turkey.
In exercising its functions the IPC is empowered to decide the applicable means of redress in each instance, namely restitution, exchange of properties or compensation. A right of appeal is further provided before the TRNC High Administrative Court. The extent, however, to which this process satisfies international legal standards, including effectiveness, falls at the centre of the analysis that follows.
It is within this context that Demopoulos should be understood. In deciding that the IPC procedure was effective, the court declared the applications as inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Importantly, Demopoulos deviates from established ECtHR jurisprudence on the impact of unlawful occupation on the rights of legitimate property owners. It undermines the significance of restitution in the Cyprus context in an arbitrary manner 21 and it unjustifiably qualifies the right of the displaced to return home. In doing so, it closes the door to international justice even to those who do turn to the IPC, as the recent inadmissibility decision in Meleagrou demonstrates. 22 This latest judicial development is illuminating as to why the findings in Demopoulos need to be revisited to re-instate procedural and substantive justice and the rule of law. 23 Before however turning to an in-depth discussion of Demopoulos and its impact on the rights of the displaced in Cyprus, it is first necessary to see what conclusions can be drawn from other transitional cases before the ECtHR concerning property-related rights.
Transitional justice and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the rights of the dispossessed
Whilst the ECHR does not incorporate a right to acquire property, the peaceful enjoyment of possessions is safeguarded under P1-1. This protects against arbitrary deprivation except in the public interest and in accordance with the law and the general principles of international law. However, as evident from the non-retroactive character of the ECHR and its Protocols, this provision was not intended to remedy past injustices such as for instance deprivation of property that occurred during World War II (WWII) . 24 This by itself casts doubt as to the ECHR's role in achieving transitional justice. 25 To this effect, P1-1 is construed in a way that furthers states' economic and social agendas and amidst a lack of consensus on social and economic rights. 26 The jurisprudence of the ECtHR on property-related matters reveals two main judicial trends. The first places the emphasis on the continuing rights of the initial owner and on strengthening the rule of law by rectifying past injustices. 27 The second trend places the emphasis on the rights of the current owner as imperative for economic stability, particularly for third parties who acquired such property in good faith. 28 Justice, according to this view, is achieved through the establishment of institutions such as the ECtHR which is sufficient to prevent repetition of the violations and to bring 'closure.' 29 In both situations, the rule of law is understood to be satisfied in conflicting ways.
The ECtHR, in an effort to retain the status quo and economic stability, has generally rejected on jurisdictional grounds claims concerning property that was taken during anomalous situations. 30 Examples are those that emerged during communist regimes and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
The judgment in Blecic is quite revealing. 31 The applicant was a Croatian citizen living in Zadar whose specially protected tenancy was terminated because her flat remained unoccupied for longer than six months. The decision was based on laws adopted at the time aimed at preventing the return of people from other ethnicities such as in this instance. The courts did not accept war as justification for such absence. 32 The ECtHR rejected the case on lack of temporal jurisdiction. Emphasis was placed on the time of the interference and not the time of refusal to provide a remedy to that interference. 33 Blecic was deprived of her property with the Supreme Court's decision of February 1996 and before Croatia's ratification of the ECHR in 1997. With the Supreme Court's decision the deprivation became res judicata. As the ECtHR questionably concluded, deprivation -as opposed to interference with peaceful enjoyment of possessions -was an instantaneous act and not of a continuing character.
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In the German cases brought after reunification the ECtHR was also reluctant to recognise the initial owner's property rights where expropriation materialized before ratification of Protocol 1. Whilst property restitution was the primary objective of 24 26 Allen, ibid, at 8-9. 27 Ibid, at 5-6. 28 reunification, 35 it was precluded for property expropriated during the period of Soviet occupation . 36 The different treatment was challenged before German courts and the ECtHR. 37 Both courts concluded that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) held no responsibility for property-related violations committed either by the former Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic (GDR). 38 Moreover, in Weidlich and others the ECommHR dismissed the case as inadmissible as the expropriations were carried out before the entry into force of the ECHR. 39 However, whilst the ECtHR could not examine questions of liability for the pre-unification expropriations, it considered whether the applicants had a legitimate expectation as a result of the 1990 Joint Declaration. 40 It held that the German government enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in relation to indemnification and restitution for violations carried out by another power. 41 The German cases, as also explained in Section 9, need to be distinguished from the Greek-Cypriot cases before the ECtHR. This is because the German expropriations took place well before the coming into force of the ECHR whereas the interferences with Greek-Cypriot property occurred after the adoption of the ECHR and have a continuing character. 42 Significantly however, in the latter cases Turkey, as a foreign occupying power, is accountable for such interferences, whereas the FRG was not since it had no control over the territory and acts under consideration. Turkey's acts in relation to the property of the displaced are tantamount to theft, 43 which makes restitution an imperative objective.
Whilst the ECtHR has been reluctant to invalidate expropriations as seen in the cases above, Loizidou signified a major turning point. It stood as an exception whereby the ECtHR held that the fact that the applicant had been denied access to her property was an aggravating factor. 44 Significantly, the unlawful character of the denial of access to property and the fact that the title to the property had not been lost led the ECtHR to conclude that the violation was of a continuing character. 45 In this regard, the GreekCypriot cases up to Demopoulos were the 'only set of cases' where the ECtHR refused to recognise a 'law' that gave effect to the taking of property.
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In narrowly construing international rules relating to temporal jurisdiction in transitional cases, the ECtHR refused to accept that the effects of discriminatory restitution laws had a continuing character, an approach followed by the Human Rights Committee (HRC). 47 In particular, the HRC held that confiscation of private property or failure to provide restitution or compensation on discriminatory grounds breached article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
48
By dismissing property claims on grounds of inadmissibility or lack of jurisdiction the ECtHR prevents access of victims to justice. 49 Arguably, its fundamental role in protecting human rights and establishing a European public order could justify deviation from strict adherence to temporal jurisdiction. 50 In trying to understand why the ECtHR has taken this approach, Judge Jambrek's dissenting opinion in Loizidou may shed some light. According to him, the ECtHR is not the forum where cases relating to transitional justice may be settled. For him, courts 'are ill-equipped to deal with large-scale and complex issues which as a rule call for normative action and legal reform.' 51 An examination of the ECtHR's jurisprudence on property claims in transitional cases therefore reveals lack of clarity, refusal to give due consideration to the circumstances under which the property was lost, but also concern over retaining stability and the status quo. 52 As discussed above, the ECtHR accepts that property rights which have long been extinguished cannot be revived and on the basis of lack of jurisdiction it rejects them. As noted, 'it is clear that there is doubt that the "ordinary" principles of justice and human rights are relevant in the transitional context' and that 'the resolution of old disputes is not within [the Court's] domain.' 53 Demopoulos, in clear deviation from Loizidou is another confirmation of the ECtHR's unwillingness to deal with massive and widespread human rights violations. The next section sets out the findings of the ECtHR and the legal basis on which it relied for its decision. This is followed by a critical analysis of the court's conclusions as well as an assessment of the reasons why, in the author's view, Demopoulos sets a significant setback to the rights of the displaced. 45 Ibid, at 17. 46 [11.6] . 49 Allen and Douglas, supra n 28. 50 Ibid, at 230. 51 Loizidou, supra n 8; Allen, supra n 24. 52 Allen and Douglas, supra n 28 at 227 and 232. 53 Ibid, at 220.
The Findings in Demopoulos
The main argument of the parties in Demopoulos was whether the remedy under the IPC should have first been used before resort to the ECtHR. On the one hand, Turkey argued that a finding in support of the legal validity and effectiveness of such remedy was inescapable, as this was set up in compliance with the decision in Xenides-Aresti. 54 On the other hand, the applicants challenged the legal basis and competence of the IPC to provide effective remedies.
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The ECtHR dismissed the applications for failure to exhaust the available remedies, a rule well established in international law and further stipulated in article 35 ECHR. This provision aims to entrust domestic courts with the main responsibility over human rights complaints allowing only a subsidiary and complementary role to the ECtHR. 56 The court does not aim to assume the role of national authorities which are better placed to know the facts and to take action to redress a violation. 57 States should also be allowed the opportunity to correct the wrongfulness of their acts. This enables only those cases which cannot be adequately resolved domestically to be considered at the European level. The significance of the rule is evident due to the practical difficulties the ECtHR is experiencing in addressing all individual complaints before it. This is particularly true today with its expanded territorial jurisdiction which has overburdened an already underresourced court. 58 These practical difficulties are central in the ECtHR's conclusions in Demopoulos according to which
The Court cannot emphasise enough that it is not a court of first instance; it does not have the capacity, nor is it appropriate to its function as an international court, to adjudicate on large numbers of cases which require the finding of basic facts or the calculation of monetary compensation 59 .
Similarly, the court rejected the applicants' claim that pilot judgments should not extend to the Cypriot property cases because Turkey had failed to comply with previous rulings. 60 This procedure aims to identify persistent systemic problems of serious human rights violations and their source. It enables states to strengthen their internal mechanisms and, in doing so, to limit the number of cases that reach Strasbourg such as in Demopoulos. 61 In this particular instance, the ECtHR concluded that the procedure is not 54 Demopoulos, supra n 3 at [55] . 55 Disassociating the question of remedies from the question of recognition, the ECtHR stressed that the existence of illegal occupation does not render all acts of a de facto authority invalid. 63 Relying on the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 64 it held that Turkey was responsible for TRNC acts and that it was obliged to take steps to comply with its ECHR obligations in northern Cyprus. To this effect the ECtHR felt compelled to accept the validity of civil, administrative or criminal law measures. 65 Concerned not to create a vacuum for those within or outside the jurisdiction of an occupying power and whose rights are affected, the ECtHR emphasised that 'allowing the respondent State to correct wrongs imputable to it does not amount to an indirect legitimisation of a regime unlawful under international law.' 66 This further led the ECtHR to conclude that the remedy introduced by Turkey was sufficient to eliminate the administrative practice complained of by the applicants.
67
Concluding that the IPC was a domestic remedy and that the rule of exhaustion applied, the ECtHR then turned to the applicants' complaint that the IPC was not an effective remedy as restitution was not safeguarded. Here the ECtHR makes a number of conclusions which in the author's view raise significant legal questions.
First, taking into consideration that over the course of the years property had often changed hands the ECtHR pointed out that 'The issue arises to what extent the notion of legal title, and the expectation of enjoying the full benefits of that title, is realistic in practice.' 68 Significantly, recognizing that the state has wide discretion as to what measures it will implement to comply with its ECHR obligations, the ECtHR concluded that the form of remedy is determined by the strength of the connection between legal title and possession and that in effect the passage of time severed this relationship. 69 Moreover, property is 'a material commodity' which can be compensated or exchanged. Whilst acknowledging that the ECHR could not be interpreted in isolation of other rules of general international law, the ECtHR stressed that it was primarily a human rights body. Subsequent to this, individual applications 'cannot be used as a vehicle for the vindication of sovereign rights or findings of breaches of international law between Contracting States.' 70 Importantly, the ECtHR concluded that it would be 'arbitrary and injudicious' to demand restitution, 'even with the aim of vindicating the rights of victims of violations of the Convention', 71 where to do this would involve the eviction of men, women and children.
Finally, whilst recognizing that the procedure before the IPC did not incorporate claims relating to violations of the right to home, the ECtHR concluded that such 62 Demopoulos, supra n 3 at [81] . 63 65 Demopoulos, supra n 3 at [95] . 66 Ibid, at [96] . 67 Ibid, at [91] . 68 Ibid, at [111] . 69 Ibid, at [113] . 70 Ibid, at [116] . 71 Ibid, at [116] . violation could be covered as part of non-pecuniary damages. This was so despite the fact that in order to submit a claim before the IPC it was necessary to hold title, leaving unprotected other categories of persons whose right to home had been infringed. 72 Having considered the findings and legal justifications of the ECtHR in Demopoulos, it is now time to critically assess some of the main conclusions of the court which in the author's view contradict legal principles and have an adverse impact on the rights of the displaced as protected under general international law.
The Impact of Political Considerations and Time on the Rights of the Displaced
Displaced persons are frequently caught in prolonged unsuccessful political negotiations leaving them in a legal limbo. What are their rights then if, due to ongoing disagreement, there is no prospect for a speedy resolution? Do the political nature of a dispute and the passage of time have, or should they have, any impact on human rights determinations? This section considers these issues in the light of Demopoulos and the ECtHR's references to the plan for the settlement of the Cyprus problem (Annan plan). 73 Whilst the latter will not be discussed in detail some reference is relevant. This is to the extent that it demonstrates how political considerations may have influenced in this instance legal outcomes in relation to the fundamental rights of the displaced.
It is true that the Cyprus dispute has been on the agenda of international fora for more than five decades. As a result of the continuing division of the island the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities have been prevented from enjoying a common peaceful European future based on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights. International players such as the UN and the Council of Europe feel that it is time to find a long-lasting settlement to the dispute which remains in its current form an anomaly in the international legal system. It is perhaps with these considerations in mind that the ECtHR referred to the prolonged negotiations and the political nature of the dispute with its practical consequences on all those affected by it.
Nevertheless, inter-communal discussions cannot be used as justification for ECHR violations.
74 This is even more so since the Annan plan never came into force as a result of the Greek-Cypriots' exercise of their right to self-determination. 75 Importantly, the Annan plan was widely perceived as not effectively safeguarding fundamental rights including the rights to property and home and freedom of movement and settlement. 76 For instance, only up to 18% of those displaced would be able to return in a period of 19 years after the plan's adoption. 77 The plan imposed permanent and 72 Ibid, at [136] . 73 The plan was prepared by former United Nations Secretary General Mr Kofi Annan. discriminatory restrictions on such rights on the basis of racial and ethnic considerations. It did not significantly differ from the constitutional arrangements introduced in Bosnia and Herzegovina and which were found by the ECtHR to be in violation of human rights. 78 Moreover, it concretised demographic alteration by allowing a large number of illegal Turkish settlers to remain in Cyprus. Such settlements impinge on the right to property and to return home and are in violation of article 49 (6) of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention -by which Turkey is legally bound -and customary international law. 79 The prohibition of population transfers by an occupying power is absolute and not subject to any exceptions such as military necessity. 80 Moreover, transfers constitute grave breaches and war crimes under article 85 (4) and (5) of Additional Protocol I (although this has not been signed by Turkey) and under article 8 of the Rome Statute.
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In this regard, any settlement must adhere to the fundamental rights and democratic principles on which the Council of Europe is founded. 82 Territorial acquisition through aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as ethnic cleansing and displacement on discriminatory grounds, should not be recognised.
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Most worryingly, the ECtHR influenced by the political realities on the ground seems to submit to such realities at the expense of human rights and the rule of law. 84 In its own admission, the Court finds itself faced with cases burdened with a political, historical and factual complexity flowing from a problem that should have been resolved by all parties assuming full responsibility for finding a solution on a political level. This reality, as well as the passage of time and the continuing evolution of the broader political dispute must inform the Court's interpretation and 78 application of the Convention which cannot, if it is to be coherent and meaningful, be either static or blind to concrete factual circumstances. 85 There are two main issues that emanate from this passage and which will be considered in turn. These relate to the relevance of political and factual realities for the resolution of human rights violations and the passage of time.
Whilst the political nature of the Cyprus problem is undisputed, it is also undisputed that it remains firstly a problem that is subjected to international human rights and humanitarian law. The UN Charter itself stipulates the obligation to settle international disputes in compliance with principles of justice and international law. 86 The realpolitik which the ECtHR refers to provides an excuse to be exempted from law. 87 This is contrary to the rules on state responsibility which dictate cessation of the wrongdoing, restitution, and, when this is not possible, compensation for any loss incurred. As noted, there is a 'need to prevent the completed wrong or the continuing wrong ... from surviving through its consequences.' 88 This is closely related to the Permanent Court of International Justice's (PCIJ) pronouncement according to which 'reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.' 89 The ICJ for its part has stressed that the political nature of a dispute did not prevent it from focusing on its legal aspects. 90 Accordingly, the political character of the situation in Cyprus does not bring it outside the realm of law. Importantly, the enjoyment of rights is not conditioned on the non-political nature of the dispute. By contrast, international human rights law protects the individual from arbitrary state action in all circumstances. As a consequence, no state action can be exempted from such legal scrutiny.
Nor is the submission that fundamental rights, including the rights to property and home, can be erased with the lapse of time in accordance with international law. As rightly pointed out, 'Allowing the time factor to weigh against the claimant in such a case would result in the legitimization of the State's arbitrary or discriminatory refusal to allow the entry of the individual to his or her "own country".' 91 Veraart agrees and challenges the position that the passage of time erodes legal claims, particularly in the case of flagrant violations of international law. 92 Property restitution for instance, irrespective of 85 Dealing with past injustices and protecting effectively human rights (and restoring them) is an essential component of any peace process. 96 Accordingly, the ECtHR's conclusion that 'with the passage of time the holding of a title may be emptied of any practical consequences' 97 finds no support in international law. Both The Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibit expropriation of property during armed conflict unconditionally, a matter discussed below. 98 The passage of time is therefore neither sufficient to take away the illegality of the act nor to remove the title concerned. Nor does it entitle the wrongdoing state to choose the form of remedy to be provided. 99 Questions also arise regarding the ECtHR's conclusion that the link between one of the applicants in Demopoulos with her home had been broken. The fact that the applicant was only two years old when she abandoned her home should not be sufficient to deprive her of the protection of article 8 ECHR. In this regard, neither a wrongful act nor time can break the legal bond that individuals have with their home. 100 Furthermore, the passage of time does not eliminate the wrongfulness of the act or the state's responsibility for an act it has ceased committing.
101 Even more so, the passage of time has no relevance when the violation is continuing.
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It can therefore be concluded that the rights of the displaced relating to their property and home cannot be compromised as a result of political or factual realities or the passage of time. Nor can a state benefit from its wrongdoing, a principle well established in international law. 103 To the contrary, it is in these circumstances that the ECtHR is called on to ensure cessation of the violation and to safeguard the rights of the dispossessed against state abuse. In the light of this analysis, the next section considers the procedure before the IPC. To what extent should individuals be expected to exhaust 93 Ibid, at 59. 94 Friedmann, 'The Uses of "General Principles" in the Development of International Law', (1963) 
A. Legal Nature and Effects of the Immovable Property Commission
One of the controversial issues in Demopoulos is the conclusion that the IPC provides an effective remedy. 105 Is, however, a remedy effective when it is the product of a violation of human rights, the law of armed conflict and humanitarian law? 106 The acquisition of territory through force constitutes a violation of a peremptory norm, and as such states have an obligation not to recognise the wrongful act or its consequences. 107 Whilst the ECtHR refused to consider sovereign issues or breaches of international law, such determination was essential for deciding the effectiveness of the remedy before it. 108 This is because the ECHR must not be read in a vacuum but in harmony with other rules of international law. 109 Despite this, the ECtHR concluded that It can hardly be expected, for evident practical reasons, that the "TRNC" authorities themselves proceed to pronounce the legal and administrative system in the occupied areas to be null and void in order to satisfy the points of principle raised by the applicants and intervening Government. 110 Yet, fundamental normative principles cannot be compromised in favour of practicalities.
As noted earlier, the ECtHR relied on Namibia which accepted as domestic remedies deeds of an unlawful de facto organ. 111 The ECtHR was indeed anxious not to create a 'legal vacuum' for those affected by foreign occupation and to enable them to seek protection of their fundamental rights. 112 Truly, it is important that these rights are fully protected particularly during conflict. The Opinion on Namibia aimed to protect legal transactions and arrangements made to the benefit of inhabitants of occupied territory. 113 However, whilst the ECtHR in Demopoulos was keen to recognize IPC acts, in its later inadmissibility decision in Meleagrou it accepted as valid the IPC's refusal to recognize the transfer of property lawfully carried out by the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus. This issue is considered in Section 8. Significantly, in this instance it is doubtful whether resort to the IPC which aims to further the status quo of occupation adequately safeguards the rights of those the ECtHR wished to protect. 114 In situations of a continuing violation of international law, the emphasis should be on the cessation of the wrongful act. Unless such cessation occurs and restoration of rights is completed, any remedy provided will be just an attempt to legitimize an illegal regime. The ECtHR interpreted Namibia 'solely from the standpoint of the Convention' 115 as opposed to general international rules which require nonrecognition of unlawful acts.
Contrary to the ECtHR's conclusions, not all remedies which aim to advantage the individual would be effective. In this regard, the ECtHR broadened the scope of the 'Namibia principle' on the basis of 'logical necessity' and having read the Opinion 'in conjunction with the pleadings and the explanations given by some of that court's members.'
116 This interpretation is not justified by the relevant passage of the Opinion itself. 117 The Opinion should be therefore narrowly construed to include only deeds of the nature mentioned by the ICJ whose emergence is unrelated to the wrongful act: whether there exists a birth, death or marriage is irrelevant to the situation of foreign occupation. In contrast, property deprivation as part of policy and practice 118 is not but furtherance of foreign occupation, the illegality of which would be opposable erga omnes. 119 For this reason, the ECtHR should not have relied on the ICJ's 'minimalist remarks' in Namibia. 120 As pointed out, the ECtHR 'cannot examine the remedies of the "TRNC" in a vacuum, as if it were a normal Contracting Party, where it can be assumed that courts are "established by law" or that judges are independent and impartial.'
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It follows from this that the requirement for exhaustion of domestic remedies must comply with 'generally recognised rules of international law.'
122 Moreover, for a remedy to be effective it 'must never pose a theoretical obstacle to an international solution.' 123 In this instance, neither the IPC nor Turkey has any legal right on the properties of the displaced. Since the occupying power does not obtain sovereignty over occupied territory it should not possess legal capacity to decide whether restitution or compensation will be granted. Moreover, since the title to the property has not been lost, 124 any compensation offered does not remove the claim over property restitution. This is because the TRNC acts are in breach of international law.
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The IPC provides compensation not for the loss of previous use, but rather, as a way of expropriating the affected properties. Section 10 of law 67/2005 illustrates this by providing that those who receive compensation or another property can no longer claim a right of ownership. Moreover, the IPC is empowered to decide as to restitution, exchange of property or compensation. 126 The inviolability of property rights during military occupation is well-protected in international humanitarian law. Any acquisition of private property against the will and consent of the owner violates international law even if there has been 'payment of a price or other adequate consideration.' This is particularly so when the property owner acts under 'threats, intimidation, pressure, or by exploiting the position and power of the military occupant under circumstances indicating that the owner is being induced to part with his property against his will.' 127 Furthermore, article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits confiscation of private property. Turkey, as an occupying power bound by the Convention has a duty to respect the occupied territory's laws. Moreover, the occupied territory's courts shall continue to function -which is not applicable in this instance. In cases concerning territorial re-adjustments that come as the consequence of armed force, the duty not to recognise the wrongdoing remains intact. This entails a duty not to recognise the decisions of an unlawful authority, an issue of particular relevance in relation to the IPC, and not to recognise territorial changes. 128 As pointed out, 'the idea of a general duty to deny effect to unlawful acts has been entertained for a long time in the inter-American world as a device for the maintenance of international law against the "principle of conquest".' 129 According to Tammes, the use of armed force entails a bar on moving treaty frontiers whilst any property, rights and interests will not be transferred to the wrongdoer. 130 As a result, neither Turkey nor the IPC can lawfully alter the rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs), rendering the IPC remedy ineffective. The very most that the IPC could perhaps do is to award compensation for the loss of use of property and for denial of access. Instead, Turkey's resolution of property claims by the IPC is intended to be permanent. As Judge Koroma pointed out, any activities 'of a sovereign nature which will change their status as occupied territory' are illegal. According to him, 'The essence of occupation is that it is only of a temporary nature and should serve the interests of the population and the military needs of the occupying Power.' 131 IPC decisions will have the effect of altering the status of property in occupied Cyprus. They will also inevitably have an impact on the right to home, free movement and settlement in breach of international humanitarian law. As the ICJ stressed, article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention does not only prohibit the act of deportation or transfer 125 Supra n 24 at 13. 126 of population but any measure taken in organizing or encouraging such transfer.
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Article 49 further proceeds to establish an obligation upon an occupying power to allow the return of the displaced people to their homes as soon as the hostilities have ended. At the same time, article 147 stipulates that unlawful deportation or transfer or extensive appropriation of property on discriminatory grounds constitutes a grave breach. 133 It is therefore clear that the IPC is not in a position to effectively challenge the situation that brought it into force. 134 The IPC is also unable to authorise the return of the displaced. The ECtHR should have therefore prevented Turkey from adopting measures intended to alter the legal status of property acquired through force. Giving legal effect and validity to such acts is inconsistent with fundamental norms of international law. Importantly, 'the obligations of the state are also unconditional: they do not depend on one another, nor are they conditional on an individual complaint. They cannot be renounced by victims.' 135 The preceding analysis has demonstrated that the IPC, established as a direct consequence of unlawful acquisition of territory by force, 136 does not provide an effective remedy. 137 This is even more so when the wrongful act is continuing as a result of official policy and administrative practice, which is considered next.
B. Administrative Practice, Effectiveness and the Immovable Property Commission
According to well established ECtHR jurisprudence, the repetition of the wrongful act as part of a policy makes remedies 'futile' and is sufficient to relieve individuals from the duty to exhaust domestic remedies. 138 This is because the ECtHR 'must take realistic account not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal system of the Contracting Party concerned but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate as well as the personal circumstances of the applicants.' 139 Turkey has pursued property deprivation and denial of the right to return home as official policy and administrative practice. 140 Such policy 'would remain unchanged pending agreement on an overall political solution to the Cypriot question.' 141 This led the ECtHR to previously conclude that the affected individual was relieved from the duty to exhaust domestic remedies as they would be unable to challenge it. 142 This policy 'must be considered continuing', 143 and indeed remains unchanged up to the present day. The persisting heavy presence of Turkish troops and the demographic alteration that was achieved as a result of transferring Turkish population to occupied Cyprus are evidence of this. The IPC cannot escape from this policy as it is the direct product of it. 144 Effectively, this is equivalent to failure to respond to the serious human rights violations. 145 Similarly, the procedure of pilot judgments must provide an opportunity for cessation of the violations. 146 As stressed, 'it is for the respondent State to remove any obstacles in its domestic legal system that might prevent the applicant's situation from being adequately redressed'. 147 In this instance, neither Turkey nor the IPC has implemented a remedy which is capable of addressing the systemic problem, which remains one of occupation and ethnic division.
In conclusion, the ECtHR should have held in Demopoulos that the duty to exhaust domestic remedies through the IPC was inoperable due to the pertaining serious violations committed by Turkey. Remedies must provide 'real access to justice' and rectify the violation. 148 The ability to order cessation and enforcement are essential requirements for an effective remedy, qualities not satisfied here. 149 In the absence of these, the ECtHR has no longer a subsidiary role to play. On the contrary, it must ensure that affected individuals are protected against remedies which aim to shield state abuses rather than to genuinely bring these to an end. Its heavy workload must not compromise the fundamental role it has been entrusted with in safeguarding human rights.
The next section discusses the significance of property restitution and the right to return home under international law and how the IPC interferes with such rights.
The Right to Property Restitution and to Return Home under International Law
Property is today well protected under customary international law and regional instruments such as the ECHR. It also finds protection in national laws, and, indirectly, through the principle of non-discrimination, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 150 Due to the detrimental effects of displacement, property restitution goes to the heart of the right to return. This arguably entails not only the right to return to one's country, but quite significantly, the right to return to one's home. 151 To this effect, principle 21 of the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Guiding Principles) protects IDPs against arbitrary deprivation of property and possessions. 152 Significantly, principle 29 stipulates that competent authorities must facilitate the return of IDPs and the recovery of their property. Property restoration is also safeguarded under principle 2.1 of the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (Pinheiro Principles). 153 Under this provision, compensation should only be provided if restitution is factually impossible. 154 Whilst the Guiding and the Pinheiro Principles are not legally binding, they constitute authoritative instruments particularly to the extent that they reflect existing customary rules. 155 Hence, the return of property to its legitimate owners gains particular significance as a tool of restoring justice and the rule of law. Importantly, unresolved property issues can cause further conflict, 156 whilst property restitution is a tool for 'reinstating victims as full participants in the social, political and economic life of the community.' 157 Restitution is therefore a principle of primary importance in international law. 158 The International Law Commission emphasises this by noting that 'restitution is the first of the forms of reparation available to a State injured by an internationally wrongful act', including the return of property. 159 Restitution is also imperative in cases of violations of peremptory norms of international law such as aggression and acquisition of territory by force. 160 The occupying state is under an obligation to withdraw its forces and to allow the return of persons or property. 161 Significantly, 'the wrongdoing state may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for the failure to provide full reparation, and the mere fact of political or administrative obstacles to restitution does not amount to impossibility.' 162 overtly political problem.' 164 Further, whilst it rejects that military occupation is a form of adverse possession by which a title can be legally transferred, it goes on to add that it would be unrealistic to expect that … these applicants obtain access to, and full possession of, their properties, irrespective of who is now living there or whether the property is allegedly in a militarily sensitive zone or used for vital public purposes. 165 Finally, whilst the ECtHR initially recognises that restitution can only be denied in case of impossibility, it does not consider whether restitution was impossible in the cases before it. 166 Refusal to provide restitution as primary objective would contravene the spirit and letter of the ECHR since the protection of dignity through property restitution is at the heart of P1-1. 167 It would also deviate from previous jurisprudence according to which compensation alone is not a 'complete system of redress.' 168 As the ECtHR has repeatedly held, Turkey is responsible for the continuous total denial of access to and control of, use and enjoyment of the property by Greek-Cypriots, in addition to the denial of compensation for such interference. 169 Restitution is also imperative under international humanitarian law. Population transfers constitute war crimes and may amount to crimes against humanity if committed in a widespread or systematic manner. 170 The ECtHR should have therefore concluded that Turkey had an obligation to provide restitution. 171 Importantly, restitution is not conditional upon the rights of third parties since the right of the legitimate owner is stronger in international law. 172 States are not allowed to use humanitarian considerations for refusing property restitution to legitimate owners. 173 Rather, states have an obligation to take all necessary steps to assist current users by providing them with alternative accommodation. As rightly argued by Buyse, an approach based on human rights rather than reciprocity 'offers to each and every one of the displaced the possibility to reclaim what was lost.' 174 Instead, law 67/2005 makes property claims conditional upon the non-existence of other claimants. This would include claims from settlers or nationals of other states such as in the case of Orams. 175 To this effect, the distinction that the ECtHR made between Demopoulos and Pincova is not justified. 176 In the latter case, the ECtHR recognised the initial owner's right to claim back his property which had been unlawfully confiscated by the communist regime in 1948. This was despite the fact that the applicants had been living in the house as tenants since 1953, and had purchased the property in good faith in 1967. The ECtHR held that the restitution laws adopted in 1992 with the purpose of reinstating the rights of the property owner pursued a legitimate aim and were 'means of safeguarding the lawfulness of legal transactions.' 177 Hence, it was accepted that the restitution given effect in this instance aimed at restoring legality. 178 Instead, in Demopoulos the emphasis is on not causing 'injustice' to third parties, whose claim has no foundation in international law. 179 In doing so, injustice is caused to the right-holders. As Allen points out, 'there is no sensible argument that the revival of property rights would amount to an injustice so extreme that a court should disregard them.' 180 The ECtHR in this instance was reluctant to expressly condemn serious injustices caused as part of ethnic cleansing and to protect the right to return home. 181 It has been shown that to overlook the right to property restitution and to return home in light of practical or political realities is to allow the violator to benefit from their wrongdoing. 182 To this effect, the inability of the IPC to ensure these rights provides an additional reason why it does not constitute an effective remedy.
Property Restitution, the Immovable Property Commission and the Case of Meleagrou
The preceding analysis demonstrates that Turkey has a continuing legal duty to provide restitution. The IPC provides therefore only a 'fictional instrument' for remedying property-related claims. 183 Its power to order restitution is handicapped by a number of conditions that go beyond those provided under P1-1 or general international law. Restitution under law 67/2005 does not appear to be a right which can only be exceptionally denied. It can be refused on grounds of national security, public order or interest, for reasons of social justice or whenever the property concerned is located in a military area. On Turkey's own admission, restitution is also precluded if the property concerned was transferred to non-state natural or to legal persons so that a 'fair balance between these conflicting rights' of the legitimate owner and the occupier would be struck. 184 The IPC aims to resolve property claims 'without prejudice to the rights of the Turkish Cypriot Community.' 185 In those cases where restitution is decided, such restitution will not necessarily be given effect until after a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. Even in these cases, however, restitution will not be automatic since the current holder will have to be granted either compensation or be given alternative accommodation as part of the final settlement. Hence, restitution is made conditional upon future and uncertain events which render the IPC ineffective.
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According to sources from the TRNC there have been 5754 applications of which only 612 have been finalised. 477 applications have been settled through friendly settlement. Out of these, only 11 went through formal hearings. In 2 cases the IPC decided exchange and compensation, in 1 case restitution, in 5 cases restitution and compensation whilst in another case it decided on restitution after the settlement of the Cyprus problem. 187 124 applications have been revoked. Whilst the number of applications before the IPC is significant, something that prompted Cyprus to explore ways to set up alternative mechanisms to support the displaced and those who wish to turn to the IPC, 188 it still represents a small percentage of the overall displaced population of 200,000 who choose not to bring a claim before it. Indeed, more individuals would have brought their claims before the IPC, had it been a genuinely effective remedy.
It becomes evident from the above figures that restitution is a rare exception. Even in cases where restitution has been decided, there still has not been restitution in practice. Buyse makes a significant point in this regard: restitution recognised by law or through judicial decisions but 'without the practical possibility to dispose of the property concerned does not end a situation of interference with property rights, but prolongs it.' The IPC relied on various grounds. First, it refused to recognise one of the applicant's ownership for 14 plots on the ground that according to TRNC 1974 land registry records these were not registered in her name in 1974, nor was she the legal heir of the 1974 owner as required under law 67/2005. 190 This was despite the fact that these were transferred, according to Cyprus Land Registry records, lawfully by the company to which they were registered in 1974 to the applicant's husband and eventually to her in 2001. It is noteworthy that the ownership was never disputed during negotiations but only after the applicant's insistence on restitution.
Secondly, it denied restitution where land was allocated to a dispossessed owner, reserved for military purposes or constituted a coastal line. This was despite the fact that one of the plots with one of the applicants' home was found to be registered in a Turkish settler's name, 192 whilst a part of another had been leased to Sunzest Trading Ltd, a company owned by Asil Nadir. 193 Significantly, the IPC refused to award compensation for loss of use and non-pecuniary damage since the applicants failed to claim compensation for effectively the expropriation of land or exchange according to article 8 of Law 67/2005. 194 The IPC also refused to award compensation for non-pecuniary damage for fields. 195 The IPC did however allow restitution of part of one plot since it had never been used as a forest as it was declared, 196 although this is still to materialise. 197 After exhausting all available remedies, the applicants resorted to the ECtHR which declared their applications inadmissible. The ECtHR refused to accept, as it had previously done, 198 the company's ownership transfer for the 14 plots. 199 This was despite the fact that the transfer was carried out lawfully by internationally recognised authorities and it is to be contrasted with the ECtHR's willingness to recognise TRNC deeds as valid on the basis of Namibia.
The ECtHR also concluded that whilst the applicants did resort to the IPC they failed to make 'proper use' of available remedies. By only requesting restitution they failed to request exchange of property or pecuniary compensation for the land, which would also have included compensation for loss of use and non-pecuniary damage. As stressed, 'The fact that the applicants did not want to claim redress which would have led to them giving up their claim of title to the land is not relevant to this assessment. It was their choice, but it excluded them from obtaining the other available remedies.' 200 In this regard, the ECtHR disregarded that compensation 'cures and rewards' ethnic cleansing by removing ownership. 201 The impact of Demopoulos is clear with an arbitrary expansion of the circumstances under which restitution can be refused. 202 Furthermore, the ECtHR failed to consider in any substantive matter whether the remedy concerned was effective as applied in the facts of Meleagrou. This is further evident from recent revelations that the area regarded by the IPC and the ECtHR as a military zone (Pente Mili) is reported to have been rented to a Turkish company to carry out hotel investments. 203 Moreover, the ECtHR refused to consider compensation for non-pecuniary damages for uninhabited land.
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Whilst Meleagrou raises a number of significant legal issues worthy of separate consideration, it becomes clear that it effectively erodes states' obligations towards restitution, particularly in this context. Even more so, it upholds the occupying power's position to punish the applicants for not accepting expropriation of their land contrary to previous case law according to which restitution was a pre-condition for the effectiveness of any remedy. 205 That the IPC has no intention of terminating the violations is further evident by the testimony of those who take claims before it, although verifying facts remains difficult. This is because Cyprus still refuses to recognise the IPC, 206 and as a consequence it possesses no information on the number or outcome of applications before the IPC, whilst applicants refuse to openly discuss their cases.
Nevertheless, information obtained reveals the existing difficulties in receiving effective therapy by the IPC which only compensates for land expropriation. 207 Moreover, the procedure before the IPC is described as 'pointless' and 'prohibitive' and subject to a number of unjustified delays.
208 Whilst the applications of Meleagrou were the first to go to a hearing, 209 it took 5 years before reaching a decision. Furthermore, whilst the IPC is required to give an opinion within 30 days from receiving an application it takes two years to do so as it appears to be under-staffed. For instance, the opinion for a claim submitted on 10 August 2011 was issued on 19 September 2013. One also needs to look at the data available to see the number of cases adjourned 'sine die'. 210 Even if cases are settled it may take months before the IPC signs the deal and even longer before the applicant is actually compensated.
211
From further research 212 it also became clear that applicants fall into two categories: those who want to sell their property for mainly financial reasons and those who aim to re-possess their property and obtain compensation for loss of use plus interest since 1974. The first category represents the majority of applicants who are in financial hardship. This comes as no surprise under the current financial climate in Cyprus. These applicants are desperate and keen to accept any compensation without going to a hearing. The compensation is calculated on the devaluation of property in the occupied areas 203 which appears to be at variance with ECtHR awards made in similar cases. 213 Applicants feel frustrated by the low compensation they receive. In many cases where the offer is too low, they prefer to withdraw their claim without prejudice rather than have to wait 5-7 years for the completion of the IPC process before going to the ECtHR.
Those applicants who insist on restitution are a minority and their claims are additionally faced with repeated non-substantive demands thereby exercising pressure to settle. The low number of cases that reached hearing proceedings (11) 214 confirms a trend on the IPC's part, which is involved in the negotiations, to avoid such hearings and to settle. This is further evidenced by the fact that hearings are only possible in the presence of the two foreign IPC members which take place for about a week, 3-4 times a year.
Moreover, the procedure before the IPC is lengthy owed to practical difficulties to handle the number of claims and to prepare valuations, as well as to an apparent lack of motivation to speed up the procedures particularly 'after it secured Demopoulos'.
Problems also arise relating to property situated in the enclosure of Famagusta -a key area in the ongoing negotiations -as the authorities employ some 'dirty tricks'. If an applicant files a claim for different properties one of which is in the fenced city, the authorities exercise pressure upon them, through non-filing of their opposition, to drop their claim regarding such property in order to consider their claims for property elsewhere.
Difficulties also exist relating to stricter demands for presentation of documents to establish ownership, such as the identity card of people who may have been dead for decades, or issues relating to accurate document translation.
Another significant problem arises with properties burdened with a mortgage. Whilst after the invasion banks in the free areas proceeded to cancel mortgages relating to properties in the occupied areas, the TRNC Land Registry Office does not have these updated records. This prevents the hearing of such claims.
As is clear from Bosnia and Herzegovina's example, under-staffing, slow procedures and the imposition of difficult to overcome hurdles are indicative of the low interest in providing effective human rights protection. 215 It therefore becomes clear that Demopoulos not only offers little incentive for the restoration of rights of the displaced in Cyprus, but it is also used to formalize human rights abuses. Accordingly, a political solution in Cyprus is hardly likely to restore the human rights of the displaced. Turkey has no genuine intention to reverse the status quo. To the contrary, it aims to retain control through ethnic division materialised through complete denial of restitution. Furthermore, Turkey still refuses to pay the compensation awarded by the ECtHR in the cases preceding Demopoulos.
216 These issues, combined with the analysis in the next section, explain why the Cyprus dispute is to be contrasted with other cases whereby peace was achieved without extensive restitution programmes. 213 Supra n 20. 214 Supra n 185. 215 
Peace without Restitution?
Property restitution remains controversial in international law. In addition to the financial hurdles and the practical complexities that restitution involves, 217 not everyone agrees on its desirability either as a tool for economic growth or restoration of the rule of law.
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For instance, some argue that property restitution is not as important in light of other serious human rights violations which may have occurred under oppressive regimes. 219 Following the territorial adjustments and population movements that occurred in Europe as a result of WWII, millions of individuals lost their properties and were forced to relocate. The problem re-surfaced with the collapse of communism when affected states were faced with the challenge of protecting their sovereign identity as well as dealing with past expropriations.
Experience however on how post-communist states dealt with restitution widely varies. It is noteworthy that no state restored property to every dispossessed. 220 In the Czech Republic for instance restitution was exempted for expropriation that took place pre-1948 or for property that belonged to Sudeten Germans. 221 This reflected the view, arguably questionable, that expropriations against those perceived to have been Nazi collaborators, were justified as collective punishment. 222 Similarly in Poland restitution of property which belonged to displaced Germans was denied through national legislation. 223 In Hungary, instead of restitution the state agreed to pay fixed rates in the form of coupons. Only properties with small market value were returned. 224 In Germany too expropriations during the Soviet control were exempted from restitution. 225 Despite these considerations, states did try to implement, to a lesser or greater extent, restitution policies. Although restitution remains in many countries an open wound as evident from cases that reached the ECtHR, 226 this has not prevented them from achieving peace. It is nevertheless necessary to understand the legal framework in existence at the time of this dispossession, when human rights and the contemporary rules on armed force had just started to find express recognition in international conventional as well as customary law. Even though such rights are now widely recognised, problems remain relating to the non-retroactive character of treaties such as the ECHR, which make restitution of pre-ratification expropriation difficult to achieve. 227 Furthermore, such dispossession through population transfers and territorial adjustments was given effect through peace treaties to mark the end of the war, such as the 1945 Potsdam Agreement.
228
For these reasons, these examples need to be differentiated from the Cypriot cases which concern dispossession in continuing violation of post-WWII international norms, including the ECHR rights, and which took effect after the latter's ratification. Moreover, unlike the post-communism cases in which the ECtHR cast doubt as to which state was responsible for such expropriations, 229 Turkey bears sole responsibility for these violations. The ECtHR itself, drawing a line between these two sets of cases stressed that in the Loizidou case the inherent illegitimacy of measures stripping the applicant of her ownership rights derived from the fact that the expropriation laws in question could not be attributed legal validity for the purposes of the Convention as they emanated from an entity which was not recognised in international law as a State and whose annexation and administration of the territory concerned had no basis in international law. As a result, it could not be said that formal acts of expropriation were carried out. 230 The case for restitution in a post-WWII context however becomes even more compelling in situations where displacement occurs on the basis of discriminatory laws. 231 Such laws, implemented in former Yugoslavia were regarded as an impediment to 'reconstruction and reconciliation.' 232 Hence, 'Return was … explicitly connected to peace'. 233 Similarly, in South Africa restitution was an integral part of the political solution and reconciliation. 234 Importantly, even if a potential future political settlement may include restitution this should not be used to deny restitution in cases before the ECtHR before such settlement has been agreed upon. Nor should a political solution concretize practices of ethnic cleansing given effect through denial of restitution.
In this light, the next session focuses on another aspect of the IPC which renders it ineffective, namely that of discrimination. It is argued in this regard that the ECtHR' s insistence on a political, as opposed to a legal, solution is problematic. basis of discriminatory, ethnic, racial and religious grounds. 235 Such policies violate both the ECHR and international humanitarian law as ethnic cleansing. 236 Although the ECtHR in Demopoulos seems to recognise that there exists a 'general policy to exclude Greek-Cypriots from their homes and properties' which did not rely 'on any objective and reasonable justification', 237 it did not examine the question of discrimination. It relied instead on its previous jurisprudence on the dispute in which no determination on discrimination was made. 238 Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that in those cases the ECtHR found violations of other fundamental rights, and this is why it did not consider it necessary to address the question of discrimination under article 14. 239 In Demopoulos, however, such examination was necessary not only in relation to whether a violation of article 14 existed, but also in relation to the effectiveness of the IPC as a remedy. The commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity through displacement and ethnic cleansing and racial division make such consideration necessary.
Whilst article 14 is read in conjunction with another Convention article, it can still be examined on its own even if the ECtHR has not found any other violation. In this instance, the ECtHR should have taken into consideration the discriminatory elements in the procedure before the IPC to determine that there was a breach of article 14 and that as a result the remedy was ineffective.
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Any interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions must also be proportionate and satisfy a legitimate aim. 241 On the one hand, proportionality is linked with the affected person's dignity. Refusal to return the property concerned causes a disproportionate harm. 242 On the other hand, the occupation of territory, forcible expulsion of civilians and dispossession on the basis of discrimination does not serve any legitimate aims. As stressed in Dokic it was 'a matter of principle' that such ethnic differentiation could not be 'objectively justified in a contemporary democratic society.' 243 Whilst states enjoy some discretion in restricting the right to property, such discretion is not unfettered. The adoption of law 67/2005 does not by itself mean that Turkey has satisfied its duty to provide an effective remedy. This is because law must satisfy justice. According to Radbruch, such justice is fulfilled if it adheres to equality. In other words, laws that discriminate are not just. 244 The ECtHR has a pivotal role to play in transitional cases. By providing an effective remedy to undo past injustices it ensures not only that practices in breach of fundamental rights cease, but also, importantly, that they are not repeated in the future. Preventing the displaced to return home and to reclaim their property has been used as a tool for 235 See similar land discriminatory practices against Australian aborigines. Marks, 'Indigenous Peoples in International Law: The Significance of Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolome de las Casas ' (1990-1991) 13 No. 1 Australian Yearbook of International Law 1 at 27-28. 236 Also see Allen, supra n 24 at 14. 237 Demopoulos, supra n 3 at [140] . 238 Ibid, at [142] . 239 Loucaides, supra n 3 at 448-49. 240 242 Allen, supra n 24 at 10. 243 Dokic, supra n 241 . 244 Allen, supra n 24 at 12.
territorial advances and discriminatory restrictions. The ECtHR, as Europe's principal human rights monitoring body, should ensure that such practices are no longer tolerated. Importantly, ECtHR decisions should comply with well established principles relating to the rights of the dispossessed.
Conclusion
Displacement due to armed conflict or foreign occupation is not a new phenomenon in international law. The deportation and transfer of large parts of population from one area to another has often been used as a tool of territorial acquisition or ethnic cleansing. However, displacement can no longer be ignored due to the grave consequences it brings to the affected people and its severe interference with fundamental rights. Hence, property restitution and the return of the displaced gain particular significance in restoring the rule of law and providing justice to the victims of past injustice.
This article has argued that the political nature of a dispute or the passage of time are not sufficient to erase the internationally protected rights of the displaced. This article has also argued that international bodies such as the ECtHR need to ensure that remedies set up unlawfully to shield and further human rights violations must not be accepted. Such remedies must be clearly distinguished from those whose purpose is to facilitate the daily routine of the affected population. The IPC is the product of unlawful use of armed force. Rather than ensuring cessation of the Turkish occupation of Cyprus and remedying the displacement of Greek-Cypriots, it aims to interfere in a permanent manner with the rights of the displaced and to legitimize the status quo. As such, it should not have been accepted by the ECtHR in Demopoulos as an effective remedy. Allowing the victim to have access to an impartial and independent court of law is of primary importance. 245 The ECtHR should therefore be able to accept as admissible individual complaints unless and in so far as 'domestic decision-makers have resumed their rightful position as the Convention's first-line defenders.' 246 The ECtHR's approach to distance the question of effectiveness of a remedy from its validity in international law is in the author's view problematic.
Furthermore, the existing hurdles on restitution must be lifted in order to enable the reinstatement of the international legal order. 247 According to the UNHCR, there cannot be 'sustainable peace and stability …. Against the background of unfulfilled desires for return; they will remain destabilising factors for generations to come…'. 248 There is indeed nothing 'maximalistic' 249 in the idea of working for a settlement of the Cyprus problem that is founded on human rights and democratic principles and is free from discrimination. Where political and factual realities come into play, the rule of law must prevail. Turkey remains responsible for depriving displaced persons of their right to enjoy their property without any interference. It also retains full responsibility for preventing them from returning home, imposing discriminatory division in violation of international law.
The preceding analysis has shown that there exists a concrete system of protection of the displaced developed under both international humanitarian and human rights law. This system prohibits practices of ethnic cleansing and displacement. At the same time, it provides for the return of the displaced and the restitution of their property rights. The ECtHR in Demopoulos should have taken these factors into consideration in determining the effectiveness of the remedy provided by the IPC. Whilst restitution is provided under law 67/2005, there is no restitution in practice or as a matter of a general rule as evident from post-Demopoulos developments.
The decision of the ECtHR has serious legal ramifications on the rights to property restitution and to return home in cases of foreign occupation and it appears to be at variance with well established rules of international law. 250 Whilst appreciating the factors that underlay the ECtHR's reasoning, Demopoulos stands in the way of effective protection of the rights of IDPs in Cyprus and elsewhere and of restoration of legality. This is evident from subsequent cases that reached the ECtHR such as in Meleagrou. The ECtHR needs to take remedial action to fill the human-rights vacuum its decision in Demopoulos has left. The ECtHR is now called to demonstrate that it is indeed 'the world's most effective international human rights tribunal', 251 and that it substantially safeguards civil and political rights as it was mandated to do. In this regard, providing victims of serious wrongdoings with an impartial and effective forum in which to be heard and ensuring that corrective justice is done is the only way forward for respect of the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms.
